

PROBLEM SET 7

due by classtime Thursday, April 11

PHILOSOPHY OF  
LANGUAGE

**Exercise 1** (15 pts.) True or false? (If false, briefly say why, or give a counterexample).

- (a) If  $S$  expresses a metaphysically necessary truth then its negation expresses a metaphysically contingent falsehood.
- (b) If  $S$  expresses an a priori truth then its negation expresses an a posteriori falsehood.
- (c) If two propositions expressed by “ $A$ ” and “ $B$ ” are analytic truths then so is the proposition expressed by their conjunction, “ $A$  and  $B$ ”.
- (d) “Pat is tall or not” expresses an a posteriori truth because you cannot think that proposition unless you have had experiences enabling you to think about Pat.
- (e) If two propositions expressed by “ $A$ ” and “ $B$ ” are synthetic claims, at least one of which is true, then the proposition expressed by their disjunction, “ $A$  or  $B$ ” is a synthetic truth. [Treat “or” here as ‘inclusive’—true if one or both disjuncts are true.]

**Exercise 2** (35 pts.) Recall: we saw arguments drawn from Kripke that there are necessary a posteriori propositions. For example, Kripke claims (a) would express such a proposition.

(a) Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens.

Consider a naive Russellian about propositions, who is also Millian (and hence accepts that names like those above are rigid designators). Here is another sentence to consider:

(b) Mark Twain is Mark Twain.

Do the following:

- (i) Does the theorist just described take the the propositions expressed by (a) and (b) to be identical or not? Explain why.
- (ii) Without taking any particular theory into account, is the proposition expressed by (b) intuitively *a priori* or *a posteriori*?
- (iii) This shows us something interesting about how the Naive Russellian (who does not give up the answers in (i) and (ii)) views Kripke's conclusions that informative identity claims like (a) express necessary a posteriori propositions. What does it show, and why?
- (iv) Does this conclusion about the Naive Russellian in (iii) extend to claims of non-identity, which Kripke also argued to be necessary a posteriori (by 'non-identity claims' I mean claims like "Batman is not Commissioner Gordon")?