

*"Obviously if any actions, even a lunatic's, can be causeless, determinism is done for. If the chain of causation can be broken for a madman, it can be broken for a man."*

*-G.K. Chesterton*

**Libertarianism:** Free will is *incompatible* with determinism, *but* we are nonetheless free. (incompatibilism is true, and determinism is false).

Virtues: has the potential to capture a "deep" kind of freedom—one on which we could be responsible for our very characters, dispositions, and desires.

Key Problem: *how can an undetermined action be a free one?*

**View 1: Simple Libertarianism:** An action is free simply if it is an undetermined action.

Something's being undetermined doesn't mean it's free. Consider,

- the roll of a die
- a random quantum state arising in response to a measurement

Well what about human actions? What does an undetermined human action look like?

- random twitches
- the random ramblings and behavior of a madman

More generally, try to imagine a single choice merely being undetermined in this way:

**Stan's Choice.** Stan is deciding whether to order fish or mushrooms. Stan thinks: "I hate mushrooms. I'm also allergic to them so if I eat them my face is going to puff up like a red tomato and they're probably going to have to call the ambulance. On the other hand I love fish, I think it tastes great, and those Omega 3 fatty acids are really good for me." A strong desire wells up in him to order the fish. He continues to think "I'll order them. Here I go..."

Key question: Suppose Stan mysteriously goes on to order and eat mushrooms. Would he have obviously *chosen* to do it? Was this a manifestation of his freedom? Would it have been *rational*?

These issues obviously matter for responsibility. Imagine Stan faced a morally weighty choice. How can we blame him for the result when it seems like the result was just *chance*?

Of course, we might be concerned about *where* the indeterminacy enters into human action.  
Options:

- (1) in development of our characters and desires. [Seems too early.]
- (2) during deliberation. [Still too early.]
- (3) between deliberation and our action. [Seems to hurt, rather than help freedom.]

*The general problem:* we typically think of undetermined actions as *random, capricious, inexplicable, uncontrolled, or irrational*. So why is supposing that our actions are *undetermined* as opposed to *determined* supposed to help explain free will?

**View 2: "Extra Factor" Libertarianism:** there is some "extra factor" standing outside the normal causal order whose operation accounts for the difference between free and unfree action.

The idea is that it is not *the fact that our actions are undetermined* that makes them free. Rather, that indeterminacy just *makes room* for this special entity (us?) to shape our actions.

For example, some dualists think that our minds or souls are just such a decisive extra factor. A dilemma for this theorist: Does the sum total of physical *and dualist* facts at a time, along with the laws which govern physical *and non-physical* entities, determine a unique future?

If "yes": doesn't this view face the very same problems as compatibilism?  
After all, this embraces determinism: it seems you *must* do what you actually do, and you "couldn't" have done otherwise.

If "no": doesn't this view face the very same problems as simple libertarianism?  
After all, your actions aren't determined by the state of the world and the state of your mind or your soul. So aren't they *random, capricious, etc.*?

The problems for this dualist strategy exhibits a general problem for "extra factor" strategies: How is adding an "extra" element supposed to help? They either will be part of a general deterministic causal order, and hence be irrelevant to libertarianism, or they won't, in which case we are still left with the very problem of explaining how undetermined actions are free that we started with.

In sum: adding indeterminacy doesn't seem to *help* free action. In fact, we seem to have plenty of good reasons to think that it might even *hinder* free action. The Libertarian owes us an explanation which avoids both of these problems. What we've seen is that it's not at all obvious what that explanation will look like.