

Summary of Views

Theory of Personal Identity	Personal identity consists in...	Problems	Allows (In-Principle) Survival of our Bodily Destruction?
Dualist Theory	Numerical identity of non-physical mind or soul	Though we are aware of identity of persons over time, we have no evidence of numerical (as opposed to qualitative) identity of souls over time	Yes
Somatic Theory (A)	Numerical identity of 'core' body (torso).	Fails to accommodate 'body-swapping'	<i>Only</i> if physical reassembly (of torsos) preserves numerical identity
Somatic Theory (B)	Numerical identity of brain.	Fails to accommodate 'body-swapping'	<i>Only</i> if physical reassembly (of brains) preserves numerical identity
Psychological Theory (A)	Participation in 'chain' of person-stages, locally linked by causal-memory.	Leads to implausible/inconsistent results in cases of symmetric fission.	<i>Only</i> if 'implanting' memories is a means of creating causal-memory
Psychological Theory (B)	Participation in 'chain' of person-stages, locally linked by causal-memory, in which no 'competitors' have appeared	Makes identity and survival into an 'extrinsic' matter	<i>Only</i> if 'implanting' memories is a means of creating causal-memory

Some things to note:

- (1) No view is without its (seemingly quite serious) problems...could our intuitions here be incoherent?
- (2) Only the Dualist Theory seems to uncontroversially allow for our in-principle survival of our bodily destruction. But it may have been the most problematic view.