

## Leibniz' Law

### Argument from Doubt

Premise 1: I cannot doubt the existence of my mind.

Premise 2: I can doubt the existence of my body.

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Conclusion: My mind is not my body.

### Argument from Introspection

Premise 1: I have infallible and immediate access to facts about my mind

Premise 2: I do not have infallible and immediate access to facts about my body.

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Conclusion: My mind is not my body.

These can be recast as follows:

Premise 1: My mind is such that I cannot doubt its existence.

Premise 2: My body is such that I can doubt its existence.

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Conclusion: My mind is not my body.

Premise 1: My mind is such that I have infallible and immediate access to facts about it.

Premise 2: My body is such that I don't have infallible and immediate access to facts about it.

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Conclusion: My mind is not my body.

The general form of argument seems to be:

My mind has the property P.

My body doesn't have the property P.

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My mind is not my body.

**Leibniz' Law:** If A is identical to B then A has some property just in case B has that same property.

(Alternate Formulation): If A has a property B does not (or vice versa) then A is not identical to B.

E.g.

The person who committed the murder has only one arm.

Dr. Richard Kimble doesn't have only one arm.

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Dr. Richard Kimble isn't the person who committed the murder.

Problems for Leibniz' Law?

Compare:

Lex thinks Superman could stop him.  
Lex doesn't think Clark Kent could stop him.  

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Superman is not Clark Kent

That's no good. This is an *illegitimate* use of Leibniz' Law. What other kinds of "properties" seem to create illegitimate uses of this kind?

- believing
- hoping
- fearing
- doubting

These are all *epistemic* terms—words for discussing different ways we *think about things*. This opens a reply on behalf of the materialist.

Materialist Reply

The arguments from doubt and introspection are based on epistemic properties that the mind and the body have. But if these dualist arguments were sound, so would other uses of epistemic properties with Leibniz' Law. But these other arguments are clearly not sound. So the original dualist arguments aren't sound either.

Two diagnoses of where things go wrong with these applications Leibniz' Law.

- (A) Epistemic "properties" aren't real properties of an object at all. They are something else. Thus the arguments are not *valid*. (van Inwagen says this)
- (B) Epistemic properties are indeed properties. But Leibniz' Law doesn't hold generally. Thus the arguments have a *false premise* (namely, a general version of Leibniz' Law).

Some unresolved issues for the Materialist:

- We want a better *understanding* of what is going wrong. Why do the arguments from doubt and introspection feel more persuasive than the argument about Clark Kent and Superman?
- Are there really no points of *disanalogy* between the arguments involving Clark Kent and Superman, and the two Dualist arguments? Can the dualist exploit them?

Another question: are there arguments for Dualism from Leibniz' Law *without* epistemic talk? Consider:

My body takes up physical space.  
My mind doesn't take up physical space.  

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My mind isn't my body.

My mind can't be divided in two.  
My body can be divided in two.  

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My mind is not my body.

These seem to suffer from a general problem...